CVE-2025-65796

Step 1: Authentication: An attacker obtains valid, low-level credentials to access the usememos memos application.

Step 2: Reaction Identification: The attacker identifies the target reaction(s) to be deleted. This likely involves obtaining the reaction ID or other identifying information.

Step 3: Crafting the Deletion Request: The attacker crafts a deletion request, typically an HTTP request, targeting the specific reaction(s) identified in Step 2. This request will likely include the reaction ID.

Step 4: Bypassing Access Control: The attacker's crafted request bypasses the flawed access control checks. The application fails to verify that the attacker is the owner of the reaction or has sufficient privileges to delete it.

Step 5: Reaction Deletion: The application processes the deletion request, successfully deleting the targeted reaction(s).

Step 6: Impact: The targeted reactions are removed, potentially disrupting user interactions and causing a denial of service for the affected users.

The vulnerability stems from a flaw in the access control logic within usememos memos v0.25.2. Specifically, the application fails to properly validate the authorization of a user attempting to delete a reaction. The code likely checks if the user is the owner of the reaction, but it does not adequately enforce this check. The root cause is a missing or flawed check on the user's permissions before allowing the deletion of a reaction. This could be due to a simple logic error, such as a missing if statement or an incorrect comparison. The lack of proper authorization allows any authenticated user to delete any reaction, regardless of ownership. This is a classic example of an access control bypass vulnerability.