CVE-2021-20171

Step 1: Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies a vulnerable Netgear RAX43 router running firmware version 1.0.3.96, likely through port scanning or Shodan searches.

Step 2: Access the Configuration File: The attacker gains access to the router's configuration file. This could be achieved through various means, including exploiting other vulnerabilities (e.g., default credentials, command injection) or physical access.

Step 3: Extract Credentials: The attacker parses the configuration file, identifying and extracting the plaintext usernames and passwords for the router's services, including the administrator account.

Step 4: Gain Administrative Access: The attacker uses the extracted administrator credentials to log into the router's web interface or access other services, gaining full control of the device.

Step 5: Network Compromise: With administrative access, the attacker can modify network settings, redirect traffic, install malware, and potentially pivot to other devices on the network.

The vulnerability stems from a failure to properly secure sensitive data. The Netgear RAX43 firmware, version 1.0.3.96, stores usernames and passwords for various services, including the administrative account, in plaintext within the device's configuration files. This indicates a lack of proper encryption or hashing mechanisms for sensitive credentials. The root cause is likely a design flaw where the developers did not implement secure storage practices, opting instead for easily accessible, unencrypted storage. This could be due to a lack of understanding of secure coding practices or a deliberate decision to simplify configuration management at the expense of security.