Source: cve@mitre.org
An issue was discovered in the atom crate before 0.3.6 for Rust. An unsafe Send implementation allows a cross-thread data race.
Critical vulnerability exists in the atom crate for Rust, allowing for a cross-thread data race due to an unsafe Send implementation. This flaw can lead to arbitrary code execution and compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems. Successful exploitation could result in a complete system takeover.
Step 1: Initialization: A Rust program using the vulnerable atom crate is initialized, and shared mutable state is created using the crate's functionality. This state is intended to be accessed concurrently by multiple threads.
Step 2: Thread Creation: Multiple threads are spawned, each potentially accessing and modifying the shared state.
Step 3: Concurrent Access: Due to the unsafe Send implementation, the threads can concurrently access and modify the shared mutable state without proper synchronization.
Step 4: Data Race: The lack of synchronization leads to a data race. The order of operations is unpredictable, and one thread's write can be overwritten by another thread's write, or reads can occur while a write is in progress.
Step 5: Memory Corruption/Code Execution: The data race can result in memory corruption, potentially leading to a crash or, more critically, the ability to overwrite critical data structures. This can be leveraged to achieve arbitrary code execution by overwriting function pointers or other control data.
Step 6: Exploitation: An attacker crafts a specific sequence of operations that triggers the data race in a predictable manner, leading to the execution of malicious code.
The vulnerability stems from an unsafe Send implementation within the atom crate. This allows for a data race condition. Specifically, the atom crate, prior to version 0.3.6, incorrectly marked shared mutable state as thread-safe. This means that multiple threads could concurrently access and modify the same memory location without proper synchronization mechanisms (e.g., mutexes, atomic operations). This lack of synchronization leads to undefined behavior, including the potential for memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, and denial of service. The root cause is the incorrect assumption of thread safety, allowing for unsynchronized access to shared data. This is a classic example of a race condition vulnerability.
While no specific APT groups are directly linked to this vulnerability, the nature of the flaw makes it attractive to various threat actors. The potential for remote code execution means it could be used by any group seeking to gain initial access or escalate privileges. CISA KEV status: Not listed.
Analyze crash dumps and core files for signs of memory corruption, such as unexpected values or corrupted data structures.
Monitor system logs for unusual behavior, such as unexpected process terminations or errors related to memory access.
Implement runtime checks and instrumentation to detect data races. Tools like threadSanitizer can be used to identify potential race conditions during development and testing.
Network traffic analysis may reveal unusual communication patterns if the exploit involves network interaction after code execution.
Review application code for usage of the atom crate and identify instances where shared mutable state is accessed concurrently.
Upgrade the atom crate to version 0.3.6 or later. This version contains the fix for the unsafe Send implementation.
Review and audit all Rust code that uses the atom crate, especially code that involves concurrent access to shared mutable state.
Implement proper synchronization mechanisms (e.g., mutexes, atomic operations) when accessing shared mutable state in multi-threaded Rust applications, even if using a fixed version of the crate.
Employ static analysis tools and linters to identify potential race conditions and other concurrency-related issues during development.
Regularly update all dependencies to the latest versions to address known vulnerabilities.