CVE-2012-6336

Step 1: Physical Proximity: The attacker must be physically close to the target device. Step 2: GPS Spoofing Setup: The attacker sets up a GPS spoofer, which is a readily available tool. Step 3: Spoofed Location Input: The attacker configures the GPS spoofer to transmit arbitrary GPS coordinates. Step 4: Data Injection: The GPS spoofer transmits the spoofed location data to the Lookout application, likely through a communication channel the application trusts. Step 5: Location Override: The Lookout application processes the spoofed location data, overriding the device's actual GPS data. Step 6: False Location Reporting: The Lookout application reports the attacker-provided location to the user or any other service using the location data.

The vulnerability stems from a lack of proper input validation and authentication within the Lookout application's Missing Device feature. Specifically, the application trusts location data received from external sources (e.g., a GPS spoofer) without verifying its authenticity or integrity. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary GPS coordinates, overriding the device's actual location. The root cause is a failure to implement secure communication protocols and data validation, leading to a trust-based vulnerability where the application blindly accepts external data.