Source: cve@mitre.org
Xitami 2.4 through 2.5 b4 stores the Administrator password in plaintext in the default.aut file, whose default permissions are world-readable, which allows remote attackers to gain privileges.
Xitami web servers versions 2.4 through 2.5 b4 are vulnerable to a critical security flaw. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to retrieve the administrator's plaintext password, granting them complete control over the server and potentially the entire network. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, system compromise, and denial-of-service conditions.
Step 1: Target Identification: The attacker identifies a Xitami web server running a vulnerable version (2.4 through 2.5 b4).
Step 2: File Retrieval: The attacker accesses the default.aut file via a simple HTTP GET request. Because the file has world-readable permissions, the attacker can directly download the file.
Step 3: Password Extraction: The attacker opens the downloaded default.aut file and extracts the administrator's password, which is stored in plaintext.
Step 4: Privilege Escalation: Armed with the administrator's password, the attacker can log into the Xitami web server's administrative interface.
Step 5: System Compromise: Once logged in, the attacker can modify web server configuration, upload malicious files (e.g., webshells), and potentially gain control of the underlying operating system, leading to complete system compromise.
The root cause of CVE-2001-1481 lies in the insecure storage of the administrator password. The Xitami web server, in the specified versions, stores the administrator's password in plaintext within the default.aut file. This file, by default, is configured with world-readable permissions. This means any user, including unauthenticated remote attackers, can read the contents of this file and directly obtain the administrator's password. The flaw is not in the web server's core functionality, but rather in the insecure configuration and storage practices employed by the software. There is no complex buffer overflow or race condition involved; the vulnerability is a straightforward case of poor security design.
Due to the age and simplicity of the vulnerability, it is likely exploited by a wide range of actors, from opportunistic attackers to more sophisticated groups. There is no specific APT attribution. This vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, but its potential impact warrants consideration.
Monitor web server access logs for requests to default.aut. Unusual access patterns, especially from external IP addresses, should be investigated.
Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on the default.aut file. Any unauthorized modification or access attempts should trigger an alert.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) can be configured to detect requests for default.aut or other suspicious file access patterns.
Review web server configuration files for any instances of plaintext password storage. This is a general best practice.
Analyze web server logs for suspicious administrative activity, such as unauthorized configuration changes or file uploads.
Upgrade to a patched version of Xitami or a more secure web server. This is the primary and most effective remediation step.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, restrict access to the default.aut file. Change the file permissions to deny access to all users except the web server process itself. This can be achieved by setting the file permissions to 600 (rw-------) or 400 (r--------).
Implement strong password policies for all administrator accounts, including password complexity requirements and regular password changes.
Review and harden the web server configuration to minimize the attack surface. Disable unnecessary features and services.
Implement a web application firewall (WAF) to filter malicious requests and prevent exploitation attempts.